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Ayer: From the Editors

FROM THE EDITORS
The question of command accountability goes to the heart of what it means to
be a military professional. Over the last few years, several major tragic accidents
involving USN vessels have trained a bright spotlight on this question. In “From
Accountability to Punishment,” Michael Junge offers a careful analysis of incidents of naval officers dismissed from the naval service, going back to World
War II. He argues that a major change can be discerned in Navy practice from
roughly the mid-1980s, when the widely acknowledged “zero defects” culture of
today first became dominant. Over these years, the distinctions between accountability, responsibility, and culpability have become fatally blurred, resulting in a
higher rate of officer firings than in the past, with debilitating consequences for
the naval profession. Captain Michael Junge, USN, is a professor in the College
of Leadership and Ethics at the Naval War College.
Since the nineteenth century, war gaming has played an important role in the
professional education of military and naval officers in many countries, and it
remains one of the key missions of the Naval War College today. The increasing
technological sophistication of commercial war games certainly helps to explain
their wide popular appeal, but in the context of military education technology has
its limitations. John Curry, in “The Utility of Narrative Matrix Games: A Baltic
Example,” makes the case for so-called matrix games designed to test human
decision-making in relatively open-ended scenarios, with reference specifically
to a recent NATO war game with a Baltic scenario. John Curry is a senior lecturer
at Bath Spa University, United Kingdom.
The recent decision by the current American administration to change the
name of U.S. Pacific Command to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command appears to be a
move of some geostrategic consequence, but so far its implications remain quite
unclear. It leaves unchanged the western boundary of the command’s area of
responsibility—an artificial line extending from the India-Pakistan border—
rather than expanding it to include all of the Indian Ocean. It is, therefore, of
considerable interest what the Indians themselves make of this. In “The ‘Indo’
in the ‘Indo-Pacific’: An Indian View,” Yogendra Kumar and Probal K. Ghosh
provide what seems intended as an authoritative tour d’horizon of India’s view
of the current state of maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean, as
well as various suggestions for how that cooperation can be strengthened. Their
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treatment of China is muted, but they indicate that, while China is not presently in a position to undermine the Indian Ocean’s current maritime “system,”
this could change in the future, and they go so far as to suggest that the region’s
maritime states should consider establishing a regime governing use of the area’s
ports by “extraregional” powers. Yogendra Kumar, a retired Indian ambassador,
and Probal K. Ghosh, a former officer in the Indian Navy, both write extensively
on maritime affairs.
As the United States steps up its confrontation with Iran with the targeted killing of Major General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020, it is instructive to revisit
our last shooting encounter with Iran, Operation EARNEST WILL, during the
last years of the Reagan administration. Little remembered today, these efforts,
triggered by the reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers by the United States to protect
them from Iranian strikes during the final stage of the Iran-Iraq War, constituted
the largest American naval engagement since World War II, resulting in the destruction of a large fraction of Iran’s navy. In “Operation EARNEST WILL: The U.S.
Foreign Policy behind U.S. Naval Operations in the Persian Gulf 1987–89; A Curious Case,” Andrew R. Marvin examines the strategic considerations driving the
American decision to involve itself in the Iran-Iraq struggle, arguing (contrary to
much conventional wisdom) that it had less to do with protecting the flow of Gulf
oil than with preventing the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in the region.
Andrew R. Marvin is an analyst in the Department of Homeland Security and a
former U.S. Army officer.
In another footnote to the naval history of the Cold War, Bill Streifer and
Irek Sabitov, in “‘Improbable Allies’: The North Korean Downing of a U.S. Navy
EC-121 and U.S.-Soviet Cooperation during the Cold War,” revisit the April
1969 incident, on the basis of much new material, particularly interviews with
Soviet naval personnel directly involved in it. Then as now, the leader of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was named “Kim.” Bill Streifer and Irek
Sabitov are journalists.
In “Sir John Orde and the Trafalgar Campaign: A Failure of Information Sharing,” J. Ross Dancy and Evan Wilson examine a neglected aspect of the situation
preceding the famous victory of Nelson at Trafalgar in May 1805: the relationship
between Admirals Nelson and Orde. The latter commanded a British squadron
off Cádiz, which was effectively, if not technically, within Nelson’s area of operations in the Mediterranean. The authors argue that Orde’s later reputation is
undeserved, and that both he and the Admiralty made unnecessary mistakes in
the way they managed command relationships and communication during this
critical period. J. Ross Dancy and Evan Wilson are professors in the John B. Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research at the Naval War College.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/2

2

Ayer: From the Editors

FROM THE EDITORS

5

IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters
Harbor Island complex. For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to
meet you at the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead
of time (401-841-2236).
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